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ABSTRACT
Widely different approaches to rail reform are evident across countries and within Australia.
Reforms have involved structural separation (both vertical and horizontal) and varying degrees of
private sector involvement.
Evidence from Australian experience suggests that no one size fits all.  The characteristics of
rail networks - namely the degree of market power, the strength of intermodel competition,
competition in downstream markets and traffic density would all influence the approach adopted.
These differ for urban passenger, regional freight (general and bulk) and long distance networks.














Railways began operating in Australia in the 1850s and, in many ways, they 
transformed transport in the country. They became vital links between Australia’s 
cities and ports and the rural hinterland, facilitated export expansion and were used 
by governments to pursue social and political objectives (PC 1999).  
However, much has changed since those early days. As more air, land and 
sea transport options have developed, so the role of rail has changed. Although 
railways in Australia still play a significant role in the intrastate transport of bulk 
commodities and general freight along major corridors, and in urban transport, 
they are not as successful in other areas. Changing modal shares with the decline 
of rail in part reflect inherent advantages of other transport modes, particularly 
technological improvements. However, there have also been concerns that the 
poor performance of rail contributed to its own decline. Indeed, one Australian 
State government told the Productivity Commission (PC) during its 1999 inquiry 
into rail reform in Australia that a lack of rail (and maritime) productivity has 
resulted in an over-reliance on air and road transport in Australia (PC 1999, 1).  
Concerns about the performance of rail led to a number of railway reforms 
and inquiries into the industry in the 1990s. However, it is not just in Australia that 
reforms have occurred. Railways in many countries have undergone significant 
changes in aspects of their organisational structure, ownership and access 




evident, both across countries (discussed briefly below) and in different 
jurisdictions in Australia (the focus of this paper). 
Reforms have included structural separation (both vertical and horizontal), 
the introduction of commercial disciplines (corporatisation and privatisation) and 
arrangements for third party access to track infrastructure. 
The wide range of reforms being implemented raises the question of whether 
one approach is superior to another. Using Australian railways as an example, this 
paper argues that because rail networks differ in terms of their economic 
characteristics and the challenges they face, it is important that individual reform 
packages be tailored to each network.  
II International reforms
2 
During the 1990s, reforms in some countries, such as Great Britain (England, 
Scotland and Wales), New Zealand and Argentina, involved increased private 
sector participation. In Great Britain, for example, 25 passenger service operations 
were established under franchising arrangements and the track, signals and stations 
were sold to the private sector.
3 Structural reform across these countries has 
involved different combinations of vertical and horizontal separation (box 1).  
Other countries have adopted reforms that change structures within 
government-owned railways. For instance, in 1994 the publicly-owned 
Netherlands railways was separated vertically into track infrastructure and train 




freight, stations, real estate). Some new private entrants have also entered the 
Dutch market. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the structure and ownership of the railways 
in selected countries
4.  
Many teething problems have been associated with these reforms. A notable 
example has been Great Britain. An apparent deterioration of services and major 
safety problems — as evident from several rail crashes in the 1990s, as well as the 
Hatfield rail crash in October 2000 — led to experts blaming the fragmentation of 
the system. One transport specialist suggested that the complex structures created 
by privatisation generated some problems, particularly relating to lines of 
accountability (Grayling 2000). Others have noted problems such as the setting of 
inappropriate benchmarks, shortcomings in liability regimes and weak investment 
incentives (The Economist, 3 July 1999, 57–60; Trace 1999). 
III Australian reforms
5 
The development of railways in Australia since the 1850s reflects the fact 
that Australia is a federation of states. There is a national (Commonwealth) 
government and eight State and Territory governments
6. 
Historically, railways have been (and many are today) under the jurisdiction 
of State governments. At the start of the 1990s the Australian rail system was 
characterised by integrated (State-owned) railways providing passenger and 




Australian National (AN) railways (owned by the Commonwealth 
government) provided long distance passenger services on the mainland, freight 
services across jurisdictions and intrastate freight services in South Australia and 
Tasmania. 
The State systems accounted for most rail freight transported. Of the more 
than 66 billion net-tonne kilometres of rail freight transported in 1996-97, for 
example, about three-quarters were accounted for by State railways. Queensland 
was the largest individual freight carrier, transporting about 43 per cent of the total 
in that year. The busiest routes (in terms of net-tonne kilometres) tended to be 
along the North–South corridor, that is, between Melbourne and Sydney and 
between Brisbane and Melbourne. However, rail had the most significant share of 
freight transport on the route between Perth and Adelaide (IC 1991).  
One of the legacies of the historical pattern of development of the railways 
was a degree of parochialism, resulting in a lack of standardisation of rail gauges. 
Standardisation of the interstate network was only completed in 1995 when the 
Melbourne to Adelaide broad gauge route was converted to standard gauge. 
A number of factors drove reform in Australian railways in the 1990s. These 
included: 
•  increasing pressure on government budgets to finance railway deficits, 
subsidies and investment (the total amount of explicit subsidies paid to 
railways by State governments in 1997-98, for example, exceeded 




(PC 1999, 263). In 1996-97, the rail deficit was A$1.36 billion 
(HORSCCTMR 1998, 110), and total Commonwealth, State and local 
government investment in rail was about A$1.6 billion (HORSCCTMR 1998, 
112); 
•  pressure on railway freight rates arising from increasing intermodal 
competition (this increased competition was due to the removal of the 
legislated monopoly previously given to rail for the carriage of certain bulk 
commodities,
7 and improvements in road transport technology and 
infrastructure); 
•  pressure on railway freight rates from increasing competition in downstream 
markets for some commodities; and  
•  the introduction of a National Competition Policy
8. 
A wide range of different structural, ownership and access arrangements was 
introduced by the states in the 1990s (table 2). Queensland has retained a single, 
government-owned railway that provides freight and passenger services and 
maintains rollingstock and track infrastructure. This entity was, however, 
corporatised in 1995-96. New South Wales (NSW), on the other hand, structurally 
separated its State Rail Authority in 1996, initially into four government-owned 
businesses (with responsibility for urban and non-urban passenger services; 
freight; track infrastructure; and track maintenance), of which three were 




In other states reforms have led to greater participation by the private sector 
through franchising of urban and non-urban passenger rail services (Victoria) and 
privatisation of freight operations (Victoria, Western Australia). The 
Commonwealth government privatised parts of the Australian National (AN) 
railways and has plans to sell the National Rail Corporation (NRC), which 
assumed responsibility for AN’s interstate freight operations in 1993. The 
interstate track was transferred to a new Federal authority, the Australian Rail 
Track Corporation (ARTC) in 1998. On the East-West Corridor across Australia, 
private operators now compete directly with the government operator in niche 
markets
9. Overall the number of private railways rose from 6 in 1991 to 19 in 
1999. 
As with the experience overseas, these reforms have not been without 
problems. In particular, similar problems to Great Britain seem to have arisen 
following structural reforms in NSW, where a series of rail accidents and concerns 
over track maintenance standards resulted in an inquiry into the safety of the 
network. This safety audit, released in April 2000, noted that poor co-ordination 
among the new government-owned rail agencies had impeded the system’s safety 
performance, and that a cultural change was required to allow the “effective 
delivery” of safety initiatives (Humphries 2000). In 2001, the businesses 
responsible for track access (Rail Access Corporation) and maintenance (Rail 
Services Australia) were merged into a single entity, the Rail Infrastructure 




Until recently attempts to privatise the NRC and the NSW Freight Rail 
Corporation (FreightCorp) had stalled. The sale of NRC was complicated by the 
fact that three governments — the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Victoria 
— had joint ownership of the Corporation.
10 Disputes over access to Victorian 
terminals and tracks initially delayed privatisation (Skulley 1999). These issues 
were resolved in 1999. In NSW, the Labor Government faced opposition 
(particularly within its own party) to a proposal, made in September 2000, to 
privatise FreightCorp in parallel with the NRC. Concerns mainly related to job 
losses and the possible impact of the sale on the regions. The NSW Government 
eventually received support for the privatisation proposal from an Upper House 
Committee of Parliament and a Country Labor Party Conference.
11  
The Commonwealth and relevant State Governments have now agreed to 
link the two businesses before selling them by the end of 2001. It is intended that 
the merged entity would have two divisions – a bulk haulage arm (FreightCorp’s 
business) and an intermodal arm for NRC’s interstate freight services. However 
concerns have been expressed that the twin sale could substantially lessen 
competition, with the merged entity holding a high proportion of standard gauge 
rollingstock. The Governments have indicated that any competition issues raised 
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission would be addressed 
through the sale process (Batchelor, Fahey, Anderson and Egan, Joint Media 






IV Performance of Australia’s railways 
Reforms in the 1990s transformed the structure and operations of Australia’s 
railways. There is now greater competition between railways and more private 
sector participation in some corridors. The Productivity Commission (PC 1999) 
found that there were significant improvements in the productivity of 
(government-owned) railways providing freight and passenger services over the 
period 1989-90 to 1997-98.  
Figure 1 indicates that the average annual growth in (total factor) 
productivity of Australia's railways of around 8 per cent was greater than that of 
Canada, Japan and the United States.  
Freight customers benefited from this improvement in productivity. Real 
freight rates fell 30 per cent between 1990 and 1998. This is comparable with 
decreases in Canada (33 per cent) and US (26 per cent) between 1990 and 1997. 
However, while Australia has narrowed the gap in productivity, there 
remains a significant difference. Australia’s level of productivity in 1998 was 
about two thirds of the best performing countries (in 1997). 
Some of the difference is due to factors that inherently disadvantage 
Australia, such as scale of operation. However, technical efficiency (productivity 







V Future reforms 
As discussed in section IV, improvements in the productivity of Australian 
railways had occurred in the 1990s but there was room for further improvement. 
Reforms during the decade had contributed to the improved performance but the 
Productivity Commission Inquiry report (PC 1999) considered that more needed to 
be done to ensure further productivity gains in Australia. It argued that a greater 
commercial focus and the harnessing of competitive forces were the keys to 
ensuring further productivity gains. Numerous participants to the inquiry agreed 
with this view.  
While steps had been taken to corporatise the remaining government-owned 
railways, the ongoing problems for these railways appear to reflect the way the 
corporatisation model has been implemented. Corporatisation aims to provide a 
public enterprise with similar objectives, incentives and sanctions as a private 
sector firm (Hilmer, Rayner and Taperell 1993, 300). The Hilmer Report noted 
five basic principles for the effective implementation of corporatisation. These 
were clarity and consistency of objectives, management authority, performance 
monitoring, effective rewards and sanctions, and competitive neutrality.
13  
However, governments still subject their rail operators to multiple, often 
conflicting objectives relating to social welfare, regional development and 
employment. Governments as shareholders face budget constraints and are often 
reluctant to provide equity funding or allow railways to borrow on their own 




maintain an arm’s length relationship with their railway boards because of political 
and community pressures. 
Even in theory, limitations apply to the corporatisation model. In particular, 
public ownership subjects governments and taxpayers to considerable commercial 
risks. 
Thus private sector alternatives to government provision have an important 
role to play in overcoming these problems. These alternatives can include 
contracting out and franchising. Competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) 
allows the introduction of competition into the provision of certain services and 
has been used increasingly by Australian railways, particularly in areas such as 
maintenance. Competition is introduced through the bidding process and so 
encourages providers to adopt efficient service delivery methods. The main 
benefits of CTC are seen to include lower costs, improved service, and greater 
flexibility (King 1994). However, contract specification is an important 
determinant of the success of CTC. As well as specifying price, contracts need to 
contain incentives or conditions to maintain service quality.  
Franchising involves the government granting a franchisee the right to 
operate a service for a fixed period. It can generate further gains because 
franchisees bear revenue risks, so strengthening their incentives to improve service 
quality and expand the size of the market. 
Full privatisation can, in theory, offer a number of benefits over public 




than public enterprises to be cost-efficient, make productive investments, be 
innovative and customer focused (see for example, Asterisis 1994). Privatisation 
thus provides opportunities to change the leadership and culture of rail enterprises 
and transfer risk fully to the private sector.  
In Australia, the Tasmanian rail system and interstate non-urban passenger 
systems have been privatised. The experience of privatisation with these systems 
is encouraging and supports privatising freight railways operating in competitive 
markets such as NRC and NSW’s FreightCorp.
14 Scrafton (2001) has argued that 
“new entrants in both freight and urban passenger railways are showing signs of 
turning around formerly declining markets, with commitments to investment, new 
services and courageous targets”. For example, since purchasing Tasrail in 1997, 
the private owners have increased traffic volumes significantly, winning major 
contracts to haul logs and containers. Tasrail’s revenue increased, while costs fell, 
making the railway profitable for the first time in 130 years. The private owners 
have invested heavily in new sleepers, communications systems and replacing the 
ageing rollingstock. Likewise, some interstate passenger routes began to generate 
positive margins following privatisation (PC 1999). 
Competition can improve peformance further. There are a number of forms 
competition can take — both ‘in’ the market and ‘for’ the market. Much of the rail 
network is already subject to intermodal competition from road, air or coastal 
shipping, and/or competition in downstream markets. The different forms of 




Competition can be facilitated by structural reform (eg vertical or horizontal 
separation — box 1) and the introduction of regulatory arrangements to enable 
access to track infrastructure. However no single structure or access regime is 
appropriate for all networks. 
VI Decision making framework 
So how do governments decide which approach is appropriate in reforming 
their rail networks? The specification of objectives and examining the 
characteristics of the rail network can help in the decision making process. Taking 
these steps allows identification of the forms of competition and structural reform 
that may be appropriate in each market.  
Specifying the objectives of reform at the outset helps to identify the 
rationale for reform, and hence provides guidance on how to best implement 
reform (and, indeed, helps to identify if reform is needed at all). For instance, the 
overarching objective of reform may be to have an efficient transport system 
meeting the freight and transport needs of a country, not to raise revenue from the 
private sector or to increase the aggregate level of service from railways. This 
implies that the extent to which each transport mode is used in the transport 
system would depend on its economic merit. Railways simultaneously compete 
with, and complement, other modes in providing a seamless transport service. 
The efficient operation of railways is an important contributor to an efficient 
transport system. The sources of improved efficiency in railways — as in other 




through one-off improvements to eliminate the sources of x-inefficiency. This can 
involve making better use of existing labour, equipment and infrastructure. 
Dynamic efficiency gains involve continual improvement through innovation and, 
in the case of rail, continually optimising its position in the transport logistics 
chain. 
In most instances rail reform packages implemented across countries have 
delivered static efficiency gains. In New Zealand, for example, there were 
significant improvements in labour productivity, asset utilisation, traffic levels and 
profit in the five years following privatisation (PC 1999, 149). To some extent 
these are the ‘easy’ gains. But dynamic efficiency is likely to be more important to 
rail in the long run. Achieving greater dynamic efficiency is more difficult as it is 
likely to involve fundamental changes to the culture and operations of railways. 
It is also important to understand the differing economic characteristics of 
individual rail networks. In a few markets, such as the transportation of bulk 
commodities such as coal, railways are able to exercise market power and extract 
monopoly rents from users. For other freight operations, railways may generate 
just sufficient earnings to be commercially viable and support future investment. 
Urban passenger rail services tend to be loss making and rely on government 
subsidies for survival.  
In addition, network interface issues, which occur when a train from one 
network needs access to another network, can potentially impede the efficiency of 




extent of interface issues will depend on several factors, including the number of 
trains from other networks seeking access, the complexity of the network, and the 
level of traffic density. 
Having identified objectives and network characteristics, the forms of 
competition likely to be effective in each network can be identified. Competition 
‘for’ the market, as occurs with franchising, is typically suited to natural monopoly 
situations where it is most cost effective to have only one provider of the rail 
service. In other markets, it may be possible to have multiple train operators 
competing for the same customers, that is competition ‘in’ the market (for 
example, long distance rail lines). This can encourage market segmentation and 
product diversity. In other markets, intermodal competition or competition in 
downstream markets may be sufficient to promote operational efficiency. 
Finally, the emphasis in rail reform on promoting various types of 
competition is underpinned by structural reform. In essence structural reform 
involves breaking up established railways into separate entities, with separation 
occurring on a geographic, functional (track, rollingstock, maintenance), and/or 
product (passenger or freight) basis. 
The potential benefits of structural separation may include the promotion of 
competition, facilitation of the regulation of natural monopoly elements of the 
track, and the implementation of appropriate policies in different markets 




Separating train operations from the track (vertical separation) is designed to 
facilitate competition between train operators for the same customers and 
competition for train schedules. But vertical separation may not be effective in 
markets where there is limited scope for more than one operator or there is already 
effective competition from other modes of transport and/or competition in 
downstream markets (OECD 1999). It may also result in coordination and safety 
problems.  
Separating railways by function or geography (horizontal separation) can 
improve the effectiveness of policies and regulatory regimes relating to different 
rail businesses. Contractual arrangements to meet non-commercial objectives 
(social, regional or environmental) can also be implemented more readily. It also 
enables services to be franchised in order to introduce competition ‘for’ the market 
through periodic competitive bidding. 
The potential benefits of structural separation need to be balanced against the 
costs. The costs of structural separation potentially can include loss of economies 
of scope, interface problems between networks, loss of commercial sustainability, 
adverse effects on safety and adjustment costs.
15 
VII Applying the decision making framework 
The PC inquiry report into progress in rail reform (PC 1999) applied this 
decision making framework to the Australian railway system. Based on their 
economic characteristics, four different types of rail network can be identified in 




For each network the problems to be addressed and the impediments to improved 
performance differ, requiring differing policy solutions. 
Urban rail passenger networks 
Urban rail passenger networks exist in the mainland state capital cities of 
Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and Adelaide. These networks are non-
commercial and only exist in their current form because of continued government 
support. In the markets served by these networks there is strong intermodal 
competition from private motor vehicles and from alternative public transport 
modes in some instances. There is no rail on rail competition. 
Urban rail passenger networks pose a variety of challenges to governments 
and their operators. These railways are often criticised for their deficiencies in 
productive efficiency, large financial deficits and poor service quality. These 
problems are further compounded by the fact that urban rail passenger services are 
highly visible to the public, often in need of capital investment and subject to 
industrial disputes. 
Given the loss making nature of these networks, governments ultimately 
decide which services will be provided and the contribution users make towards 
the cost of provision. The performance of the urban transport system can be 
improved by ensuring that urban rail services fulfil an appropriate role within the 
system (improving allocative efficiency) and then that those services are provided 




Allocative efficiency can be improved through the rigorous application of the 
purchaser-provider framework. The purchaser-provider framework separates the 
responsibility for deciding which goods and services are provided to the 
community from the responsibility for delivering the services (PC 1999). 
Governments consider and decide on the choice and mix of transport services 
purchased to promote stated objectives, rather than leaving such decisions to 
railway management.
16 
Greater operational efficiency can be encouraged by generating competition 
for the market through contracting or franchising. This approach is preferred to 
promoting competition between train operators. Urban rail passenger services 
require that trains run frequently and to a complex timetable. Coordination of 
services to meet the timetable is likely to be more effectively undertaken by one 
operator. In addition, the relatively small size of many urban passenger networks 
in Australia limits the scope for competition between train operators for the same 
customers.  
Vertical integration can facilitate the franchising process and operational 
efficiency of urban passenger networks Vertical separation is not warranted 
because there are no benefits to be obtained (through competition between train 
operators) to offset the costs of separation. In addition, accountability is also likely 
to be weakened in such a structure. If service standards are not achieved or if 




sanctions. As noted by Kain (1998), apportioning blame for poor performance may 
require considerable information and administration on the part of the regulator.  
Horizontal separation of urban rail passenger networks from other rail 
networks can facilitate the application of the purchaser-provider framework by 
clearly delineating those services requiring government support from other 
commercial rail operations and networks. In addition, it may be worthwhile to 
horizontally separate the networks further into two or more geographically based 
franchises to promote ‘yardstick’ competition, provided the population size is 
sufficient to support such separation.
17  
The benefits of further horizontal separation need to be balanced against 
potential interface and coordination issues that may occur between operators over 
shared segments of the network.
18 It has been argued, including by participants to 
the PC’s inquiry into rail reform (PC 1999), that in some instances the horizontal 
separation of urban rail passenger networks from other rail networks is 
impracticable due to the interface issues between them. However, there are 
examples both in Australia and overseas of contractual arrangements being used to 
overcome such problems. In Victoria, there are contractual arrangements between 
an urban passenger operator in Melbourne, M-Train (formerly Bayside Trains), 
and interstate and regional operators that allow the use of the urban network by 
non-urban and freight trains. Similar arrangements also apply in the United States 




can be obtained from horizontally separating urban rail passenger networks 
outweigh the cost of such contractual arrangements. 
Regional networks 
Regional networks in Australia refer to those rail lines that extend from the 
ports and capital cities into the regional areas as well as lines from regional areas 
that connect into the interstate network. Within the regional networks of New 
South Wales and Queensland are the main coal lines that are discussed separately 
below. The services provided by regional networks are dominated by the transport 
of general freight and grains. The financial performance of these networks is 
mixed. Some networks have been able to generate sufficient revenues to earn a 
commercial return, while others are reliant on government support. In virtually all 
instances, the freight carried on regional networks is subject to strong intermodal 
competition, especially from road. 
The poorly performing regional networks are confronted with the problems 
of declining market shares, increasing financial deficits and a running down of 
existing infrastructure. These problems have arisen primarily due to these 
railways’ inability to meet new competitive challenges, especially from road 
transport. This stems mainly from government involvement. In many instances, 
governments have required railways to pursue a range of conflicting objectives, 
interfered with their day-to-day operations and restricted their access to capital. 
This has reduced the ability of these railways to meet customer needs at 




the infrastructure base. At the same time, governments have deregulated freight 
carried by road, exposing rail to increasing competition. 
Regional networks in Australia need to achieve both static and dynamic 
efficiency gains if they are to survive in the competitive transport markets in 
which they operate.  
As the impediments to improved performance primarily stem from 
government involvement, the most effective way of overcoming them is to 
increase the commercial focus of regional networks. This requires that railway 
managers have the flexibility to make timely decisions, the ability to form strategic 
alliances, to access capital, and not face undue restrictions on input choice. 
The commercial focus of government-owned railways can be improved 
through corporatisation. However, as noted earlier, there are often limitations on 
how well the corporatisation model is applied. In particular, governments are often 
unable to maintain an arm’s length relationship from their railway boards because 
of political and community pressure.  
The limitations of government ownership can be overcome through greater 
private sector participation by either franchising or full privatisation. Privatisation 
of rollingstock and a long-term lease on infrastructure are preferred to franchising 
in this case because it allows for greater commercial focus and increased 
flexibility. 
Alternatively, the performance of regional railways could be improved by 




combined with access arrangements. However, the small volumes of freight 
carried on regional networks, and the resulting inability to achieve economies of 
scale, suggest that profitable entry by third party operators is likely to be limited in 
most instances. Importantly, as already noted, there is competition from other 
transport modes, which would encourage improved performance by the incumbent 
operator. The impediments to improved performance are not a lack of competition 
but rather an inability to meet existing competitive challenges. 
Thus vertical integration appears to be appropriate for regional railways, 
since vertical separation makes little, if any, contribution to overcoming the main 
impediments to improved performance. 
Regional networks are also particularly suited to horizontal separation. This 
would clearly delineate those markets where direct government involvement is not 
required. Rail management would have the freedom to focus on developing new 
market opportunities and increase operational efficiency. ‘Light handed’ access 
arrangements can be tailored to ensure that non-competing trains from other 
networks can gain fair and reasonable access. However, it is expected that access 
would not be an issue because owners would have incentives to provide access to 
non-competing trains as the increased traffic flow can increase profits to the track 
owner or lessee. 
Main coal lines 
The main coal lines in Australia are defined as the Hunter Valley coal 




Blackwater regions in Queensland. These networks carry high volumes, are highly 
profitable and have a natural monopoly in the carriage of almost all coal in these 
regions (that is, there is little competition from road or rail-on-rail competition). 
Unlike other rail networks in Australia, the main coal lines have maintained 
their market share in the transport of coal and investment has been easily justified 
on a strictly commercial basis. In this instance, the problems associated with the 
main coal lines are those of market power and the extraction of monopoly rents 
from mining companies, as well as inefficient operations. 
There are two main reform packages the state governments could implement 
to control the existence of market power on the main coal lines. First, competition 
between train operators could be encouraged, with monopoly pricing of the track 
infrastructure addressed through access regulation. Alternatively, franchising of a 
vertically integrated network may be used to promote competition ‘for’ the market 
by awarding contracts for the right to supply rail services (track and train). 
Tenders could be awarded on the basis of the lowest total cost of service provision 
over a relevant period. Track and rollingstock could be leased to the franchisee 
and access conditions incorporated into franchise agreements. 
The appeal of the first approach is that competition between train operators 
can control monopoly pricing on the part of operators, while vertical separation 
can increase the transparency of access price regulation. However, there are some 
practical problems with this approach. In the first instance, sunk costs associated 




to potential new entrants. This problem is compounded by the fact that the 
rollingstock used to haul coal is specific to the haulage of bulk commodities 
(especially the wagons), reducing its transferability to other rail markets. 
In addition, even if effective competition between train operators could be 
achieved, the issue of monopoly pricing still exists in track infrastructure. The 
control of such monopoly power requires complex regulation. 
Franchising has the advantages that the bidding process can be designed to 
facilitate the transfer of assets (especially the rollingstock), removing a substantial 
barrier to entry and making the market more contestable (OECD 1999). The 
franchisee has commercial incentives to obtain dynamic efficiencies and lower 
costs by improving the role of railways in the transport logistics chain between the 
mines and port(s). In addition, franchising reduces the need for prescriptive access 
regulation. Periodic retendering and awarding contracts on the basis of the lowest 
freight rate can help to reduce monopoly rents (PC 1999). 
However, franchising is not a perfect or costless solution to controlling 
monopoly pricing. The OECD (1999) identified three potential difficulties with the 
franchising of rail services, including: the possibility of uncompetitive bidding 
when there are insufficient bidders; the difficulties of choosing between bids that 
offer different packages; and the specification and administration of contracts. 
On balance, the economic characteristics of the main coal lines suggest that a 
process of franchising through competitive tendering is likely to be superior to 




both approaches through access regulation or the franchise process and 
agreements. However, it is less certain that vertical separation and access 
regulation will lead to new operators entering the market owing to the sunk costs 
associated with the rollingstock required. As noted earlier, the franchising process 
can be designed to overcome this problem, making the market more contestable to 
potential operators. 
To facilitate the franchising process, the main coal lines could be 
horizontally separated from other networks. The isolation of the network, together 
with transparent information on the costs and revenues of the franchise would 
provide confidence to coal companies that monopoly pricing practices had been 
eliminated.  
Interstate network 
The interstate network can be broadly defined as the standard gauge track 
linking all mainland state capital cities. The markets served by the interstate 
network are varied, including freight (generally containerised) and interstate 
passenger services. 
The financial returns on the interstate network have traditionally been poor. 
Although never highly profitable, the profitability of the National Rail Corporation 
(NRC), which carries freight on the interstate network, deteriorated significantly 
after the introduction of private operators on the network in 1995-96 (PC 1999, 
29).
19 There is strong intermodal competition (from road and coastal shipping) in 
almost all markets served by the interstate network.




differentiates the interstate network from regional networks is that for the former 
there are multiple network owners, responsible for allocating train schedules and 
undertaking investment. 
Currently the Australian Rail Track Corporation’s responsibilities for the 
interstate network are limited to the track that it owns (that is, in South Australia 
and parts of New South Wales, Western Australia and Northern Territory) or 
manages (Victoria). Operators face significant costs in negotiating access and train 
schedules with numerous owners.
21 
Figure 2 shows that he interstate network initially lost considerable market 
share to road, in both the transport of non-bulk freight and interstate passengers.
22 
The operating deficits of the network have discouraged investment, resulting 
in a deterioration of the infrastructure, further eroding the competitive position of 
railways. It has been estimated that more than half the expenditure of the 
Commonwealth from the late 1970s to 1996-97 covered operating losses and 
historical debt of its railway bodies (HORSCCTMR 1998). This, it has been 
argued, diverted expenditure from capital works. Some participants to the PC’s rail 
inquiry noted that there has also been “neglect” of the interstate network by state 
governments (PC 1999, 237). A number of reports in the 1990s (HORSCCTMR 
1998; Maunsell 1998; Booz Allen & Hamilton 1998) presented evidence of the 
inadequacy of rail infrastructure. Participants to the PC’s inquiry also discussed 
the inadequacy of investment the contributed to problems in the interstate network 




There are two main underlying causes of the loss of competitiveness of rail. 
First, government ownership and incentive arrangements have impeded the ability 
of train operators to improve operational efficiency and achieve dynamic 
efficiency gains through market segmentation and better integration into the 
transport logistics chain. Second, the multiplicity of network managers imposes 
costs on train operators in negotiating train schedules and access charges. This 
impedes the efficient allocation of train schedules, overall use of the network and 
investment. 
These impediments can in part be overcome through the proposed 
privatisation of NRC and encouragement of more rail-on-rail competition from 
private niche operators. To overcome the problems associated with multiple 
owners of the track infrastructure, integrated management of the network is 
required. This could be achieved by establishing a single network manager to 
manage the operation of the interstate track on behalf of both train operators and 
track owners. This approach has a number of possible advantages. For instance, it 
reduces the coordination issues inherent in having multiple managers of the 
network. It also avoids the conflicts of interest that could arise if the manager also 
owned the track or rollingstock. An access regime could allow for train schedules 
to be allocated by auctioning or other market trading methods. This would 
maximise the economic value of the network by allocating train schedules to those 
operators that valued them the highest. Flexible pricing arrangements would 




The successful implementation of this approach would be dependent on the 
vertical separation of train operations from the track infrastructure. This is to avoid 
any conflict of interest or difficulties that may arise from one party both owning 
one segment of the network and providing train services in competition with other 
operators. 
VIII Implications for existing arrangements 
The differentiated approach described above has different implications in 
each Australian jurisdiction because of differences in the characteristics of their 
railways. The potential for further reform exists in them all. 
It has particular implications in states where coal lines are horizontally 
integrated with the rest of the network (Queensland and NSW), or where freight 
operations are still government-owned (Queensland, and until the sale of 
FreightCorp was announced, NSW). In New South Wales, consideration could 
also be given to going further and reintegrate the track and operations. It could 
adopt the Victorian model such that the privatisation of FreightCorp would involve 
a long term lease over the non-metropolitan intrastate track (with appropriate 
access arrangements). All passenger services could be franchised. The franchisees 
would buy (or lease) the rollingstock and lease the track from the government. 
Further reform of the interstate network has particular implications for the 
Commonwealth, New South Wales, and Western Australian Governments. They 
are currently owners of parts of the network and have separate access regimes. The 




network is vertically separated and the manager did not own the track 
infrastructure. This approach would allow coordinated management and promote 
competition over the entire interstate network, generating significant benefits and 
give rail an opportunity to strengthen its competitive position on this important 
transport corridor. 
Further investigation could also show that the PC’s recommended approach 
may have relevance for some networks in other countries. 
The European network, for example, traverses many countries in the same 
way as Australia’s interstate network traverses a number of states. It is used 
heavily by both freight and passenger trains. This suggests that the approach 
suggested for Australia’s interstate network — involving vertical separation and a 
single network manager — could be relevant in this context.  
Like Australia’s regional railways, Eastern Europe railways are often heavily 
involved in moving general and bulk freight to ports. Where there is already 
sufficient intermodal competition, consideration could be given to greater private 












The Australian Productivity Commission considered that the overarching 
objective of rail reform should be to improve the efficiency of a country’s 
transport system. It argued that it should not be seen as a means of involving the 
private sector to compensate for inadequate government investment in loss making 
railways. 
An important conclusion from the Productivity Commission inquiry was that 
the implementation of a common reform package is unlikely to overcome the 
impediments to improved performance in all markets. Individualised approaches 
need to be developed on a case-by-case basis for each type of rail network. 
Crucial to developing individualised approaches is identifying the 
characteristics of markets and their boundaries. Even where rail infrastructure is 
considered a ‘natural monopoly’ in a technological sense, other characteristics 
influence the ability of providers to exercise market power and, thus, the 
appropriate policy approach for a particular network. These characteristics, which 
will differ across rail networks, include the strength of intermodal competition 
from air and road, the degree of competition in downstream markets, and traffic 
density. As such, the appropriate structural and ownership arrangements will differ 
for long distance, regional and urban passenger rail networks. 
Tradeoffs are inevitable. While vertical separation may assist in promoting 
competition and reducing monopoly rents, it may result in a lack of accountability, 




Great Britain and New South Wales. In particular, the implementation of strong 
access regulation to promote competition may diminish incentives for business to 
invest in maintaining and upgrading the rail infrastructure. Horizontal separation 
of different networks may promote viable businesses but interface issues between 
networks may arise. Where viable, however, horizontal separation can allow 
different policies to be implemented for networks with different characteristics.  
Systematic analysis of structural reform and ownership options would 
involve assessing the relevance and likely magnitude of the associated costs and 
benefits. 
This paper has highlighted considerations that may be relevant to 
determining the preferred vertical structure of particular networks.  
•  Where there is sufficient intermodal competition and the possibility of 
rail-on-rail competition developing, vertical separation would be 
appropriate. Benefits are likely to be most significant when infrastructure 
and operations are relatively independent (OECD 1999). 
•  Where there is intermodal competition but little possibility of rail-on-rail 
competition (for example, where the potential market is small), gains 
from vertical separation are unlikely to outweigh the costs. In this case, 
vertical integration and promotion of competition for the market (through 
franchising, for example) would be preferred. 
•  Where there is market power in the network, vertical integration may also 




basis of the lowest freight rate can help to reduce monopoly rents. 
Vertical separation, on the other hand, could result in the transfer of 
monopoly rent from train to track operations. In addition, where there are 
barriers to entry such as sunk costs in above rail operations, rail-on-rail 
competition is unlikely to develop. 
In short, there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach to rail reform. Care must 
be taken to ensure that the reform strategy adopted is relevant to the network type, 
taking into account its economic characteristics, and is only implemented when the 
gains exceed the costs. 
Post script 
Since this paper was originally presented, the Australian rail reform process 
has continued, including the sale of NRC and FreightCorp in January 2002, and 
the establishment of access arrangements for the parts of the interstate network 
controlled by the Australian Rail Track Corporation. 
In addition, several developments have highlighted difficulties that can arise 
in implementing reform. 
In December 2002, one of the private operators of the Victorian urban rail 
passenger network (M-Train), which had incurred large financial losses, withdrew 
from the system. (Its part of the network is being operated by receivers on behalf 
of the Victorian Government, until a decision is made about longer-term 
arrangements.) Several factors are likely to have contributed to M-Train’s 




market (eg urban passenger), if it leaves individual providers with a market which 
is too small and/or fragmented. Connex, the current operator of the other part of 
the system, argued that horizontally separating the Victorian urban network has 
been inefficient, and has expressed interest in operating the whole system 
(Masanauskas 2003). Thus, the attempt by the Victorian Government to adopt a 
‘one size fits all’ approach to its urban network, by emulating the UK, appears to 
have failed because it paid insufficient attention to local conditions, particularly 
the relatively small size of the market. This does not, however, undermine the 
principle of horizontally separating the urban rail passenger network from other 
rail networks. 
In 2001, investment disincentives — purportedly created by the pricing rules 
for the rail freight access regimes in Victoria and New South Wales — were raised 
as an issue to a Productivity Commission inquiry into the Australian national 
access regime (PC 2001). The potential ‘chilling’ effect of access regulation for 
investment (in all industries) was highlighted as a major concern in the 
Commission’s final report (PC 2001). It suggested some general principles that 
would allow access regimes to facilitate efficient new investment. These included 
setting regulated access prices to generate expected revenue that: at least meets the 
efficient long-run costs of providing access; covers the directly attributable or 
incremental costs of service provision; and includes a return commensurate with 
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1. This paper is based on the report of an inquiry into progress into rail reform 
undertaken by the Productivity Commission for the Australian Government in 
1999 (PC 1999). However, some views expressed in this paper do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Productivity Commission. I am grateful to John Salerian, Kim 
Gusberti, the seminar discussants and referees for comments and assistance. 
2. Discussion of rail reform in Argentina, Australia, Great Britain, Germany, 
Sweden and other European countries can be found in World Bank (1996), PC 
(1999), Kain (1998), Bowers (1996), Jansson and Cardebring (1989) and ECMT 
(2001). 
3. The British Government released a White Paper in 1992 proposing changes to 
the railways. The Railways Act 1993 allowed the structural reform of the railways, 
which were sold or franchised in 1997. 
4. PC (1999) benchmarked Australia’s railways with selected systems in Europe, 
America and Japan. Railways in other Asian countries were not examined. 
5. Rail reform in Australia is discussed further in PC (1999), Salerian (1999) and 
Scrafton (2001). 
6. The States and Territories of Australia are New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory 





7. IC (1991) and PC (1999) discuss the restrictions that existed on the intrastate 
carriage of particular commodities. For example, rail was required to transport 
coal (in NSW and Queensland) and domestic grains and petroleum (in Victoria, 
Queensland and Western Australia).  
8. In 1995 the Council of Australian Governments agreed to implement a package 
of measures to extend competition policies to previously exempt sectors of the 
economy. A Competition Principles Agreement established principles for 
structural reform of public monopolies, competitive neutrality between the public 
and private sectors, prices oversight of government business enterprises, regimes 
to provide access to essential facilities and reviews of legislation restricting 
competition. 
9. The former AN system now consists of two private operators (Australia 
Southern Railroad, Australian Transport Network), a corporatised government 
freight operator (NRC), a private passenger train operator (Great Southern 
Railway) and a government track authority (ARTC). 
10. NRC is 70 per cent owned by the Commonwealth, with minority stakes held 
by NSW (20 per cent) and Victoria (10 per cent). 
11. The NSW Labor Government support for the sale of FreightCorp was based on 
Commonwealth Government decisions to privatise NRC but prohibit the sale of 
NRC to FreightCorp. The NSW Government argued that the privatisation of NRC 
would have left FreightCorp vulnerable to ‘cherry-picking’ of its most profitable 





November 2000 voted to condemn the privatisation of NRC, but to make it a 
condition of sale of Freight Corp that it be sold to the same bidder as NRC 
(Murphy, 2000). An Upper House Committee of the NSW Parliament also made 
several recommendations about conditions to be attached to the privatisation 
which were incorporated in legislation (NSW Legislative Council 2001).  
12. The Trade Practices Act 1974 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that have the 
effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a substantial 
market. The ACCC has the power to reject mergers that would substantially lessen 
competition, but can also ‘authorise’ these where there is sufficient public benefit. 
13. In October 1992, a committee inquiry was established by the Prime Minister, 
with the support of State and Territory Governments, on the need for a national 
competition policy and its basic principles. The report of the inquiry (Hilmer, 
Rayner and Taperell 1993) became known as the Hilmer Report, after the 
Committee’s chairman Frederick G. Hilmer. 
14. The PC Inquiry report recommended privatising all remaining government – 
owned freight operations, with special arrangements for the rollingstock on the 
main coal lines (PC 1999, 145-51). 
15. PC (1999, pp. 107–8) discusses the potential costs of vertical separation in 
more detail. Further information can also be obtained from: Kessides and Willig 
(1995); Brooks and Button (1995); Thompson (1997); King (1997); OECD 





16. The PC identified five stages in the implementation of the purchaser-provider 
framework, including the specification of policy objectives, specification of rail 
services required to promote the objectives; determination of the level and form of 
subsidy; delivery of specified services; and costing of rail services (PC 1999, 12-
16). 
17. The establishment of the 25 horizontally separated passenger franchises in the 
United Kingdom is an example. In Victoria, the UK approach was adopted with 
the horizontal separation of the Melbourne urban train system into two franchises 
(Bayside Trains and Hillside Trains).  
18. In Australia, network interface issues are of particular concern in Sydney 
where congestion in the urban passenger network restricts the passage of freight 
trains. Interface issues also arise between the interstate and regional networks, as 
well as between the main coal lines and regional networks. 
19. NRC made operating losses of between A$5 million and A$31 million in the 
period 1996-97 to 1999-00 and recorded a modest profit before tax of A$2.3 
million in 2000-01. 
20. For example, in 1994-95 the interstate transport of bulk commodities was 
dominated by coastal shipping (95% of the market). In contrast, road dominated 
the transport of non-bulk freight (57 per cent of the market compared to 32 per 





21. Currently four authorities are responsible for the administration of access, five 
authorities have a role in allocating train schedules and five authorities undertake 
investment in the network. 
22. Rail market share of freight traffic on the East-West Corridor reached a low of 
65.2% in 1995-96 but has started to rise again, to 77% in 1999-00, the highest 
level in a decade. This in part reflects the recent growth in rail-on-rail competition 
from niche private operators (ARTC 2001). 
  
 
Box 1    Definitions relating to structural separation 
 
Structural separation: businesses are separated into discrete legal entities 
Horizontal separation: occurs either by product (freight and passenger services) or by 
geographic area (interstate, regional and urban railways). 
Vertical separation: functional levels are separated (track infrastructure and train 
operations). 
Above track or  train operations: the provision of rail freight and passenger transport 
services involving locomotives and other rollingstock. 
Below track or track infrastructure: physically fixed rail facilities such as track, sleepers, 








Structure  Train operator   Track 
infrastructure 




Canada  Horizontally separated (by 
function) and vertically integrated 
with access for passenger services 
 
Various private  Various private 










Japan  Horizontally separated (by 
function) and vertically integrated 







control of track 






New Zealand  Horizontally and vertically 
integrated  
 
Private Government  (leased 
for nominal rent) 






United States  Horizontally separated (by 
function) and vertically integrated 
with access for passenger services 
Various private  Various private 
Source: PC (1999, p. E2). 
  
 




Structure  Train operator   Track 
Infrastructure 
Commonwealth Vertically  separated 
 




NSW  Horizontally and vertically 
separated 
 




Victoria  Horizontally separated and 
vertically integrated 
 
Private Government  (lease 
urban and non urban) 
Queensland  Horizontally and vertically 




Western Australia  Horizontally separated and 
vertically integrated (with 
access for third parties)  
 
Government and private  Government (lease 
non urban) 
South Australia  Horizontally separated and 
vertically integrated 
 
Government and private ª  Government (lease 
non urban) 




ª  NSW’s FreightCorp has won a major coal haul contract in South Australia and NR is operating 
  intrastate services in NSW. 
Source: PC (1999). 
 
 Box 2    Definitions relating to competition 
Intermodal competition: competition between rail and other modes of transport, such as 
road and coastal shipping. 
Competition ‘for’ the market:  competition between bidders tendering for the exclusive 
right to provide a specified service over a given period of time. 
Competition ‘in’ the market:  competition between train operators for the same customers 
on a given network (rail-on-rail competition). 
Competition for train schedules:  competing demands by train operators for access to the 
track infrastructure.  This can occur between train operators serving different markets (for 
example, freight and passenger services); between operators competing for the same 
customers; or between trains with different origins/destinations wishing to travel over 
common segments of the network. 
Competition in downstream markets:  competition in markets which railways serve. 
Yardstick competition: involves comparing the performance of organisations with similar 
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